Suppose that a set of m tasks are to be shared as equally as possible amongst a set of n resources. A game-theoretic mechanism to find a suitable allocation is to associate each task with a "selfish agent", and require each agent to select a resource, with the cost of a resource being the number of agents to select it. Agents would then be expected to migrate from overloaded to underloaded resources, until the allocation becomes balanced.
Introduction
Suppose that a consumer learns the price she would be charged by some domestic power supplier other than the one she is currently using. It is plausible that if the alternative price is lower than the price she is currently paying, then there is some possibility that she will switch to the new power supplier. Furthermore, she is more likely to switch if the ratio of current price to new price is large. If there is only a small saving, then it becomes unattractive to make the switch, since an influx of new business (oneself and other consumers) may drive up the price of the new power supplier and make it no longer competitive.
We study a simple mathematical model of the above natural rule, in the context of a load balancing (or task allocation) scenario that has received a lot of recent attention. We assume the presence of many individual users, who may assign their tasks to chosen resources. The users are selfish in the sense that they attempt to optimize their own situation, i.e., try to assign their tasks to minimally loaded resources, without trying to optimize the global situation. In general, a Nash equilibrium among a set of selfish users is a state in which no user has the incentive to change her current decision. In our setting, this corresponds to no user having an incentive to reallocate their task to some other resource. An -Nash equilibria is a standard notion of approximate Nash equilibrium, and is a state where no user can change her cost by a multiplicative factor of less than 1 − by changing action. Here we do not focus on the quality of equilibria, but rather on the (perhaps more algorithmic) question of convergence time to such a state.
We assume a strongly distributed and concurrent setting, i.e., there is no centralized control mechanism whatsoever, and all users may choose to reallocate their tasks at the same time. Thus, we do not (and cannot) use the traditional Elementary Step System, where the assumption is that at most one user may reallocate her task at any given stage [8, 5] .
Throughout we let m denote the number of tasks (in the above discussion, customers) and n the number of resources (power suppliers). As hinted in the above discussion, we assume that typically m n. In a single time step (or round) each task does the following. Let i be the resource currently being used by the task. Select j uniformly at random from {1, . . . , n} and find the load of resource j. Let X i and X j be the loads of resources i and j respectively. If X j < X i , migrate from i to j with a probability of 1 − X j /X i ; the transition from round t to round t + 1 is given in Figure 1 . Notice that if we had unconditional migrations, i.e., without an additional coin flip (move only with probability 1 − X j (t)/X i (t)), then this may lead to an unstable system; consider for example the case m = 2 with initially most tasks assigned to one of the resources: the overload would oscillate between the two resources, with a load ratio tending towards 2:1.
For each task b do in parallel
Let i b be the current resource of task b Choose resource j b uniformly at random Let X i b (t) be the current load of resource i Let X j b (t) be the current load of resource j
Figure 1: The protocol with "neutral moves" allowed.
It can easily be seen that, if all tasks use the above policy, then the expected load of every resource at the next step is m/n. This provides a compelling motivation for the policy, which is that as a result, no task has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from this policy. In the terminology of [6] this is a Nash rerouting policy. Although the above rule is very natural and has the nice property as described above, we show that it may take a long time to converge to an perfectly balanced allocation of tasks to resources. Define a neutral move to be a task migration from a resource with load at time t to a resource with load − 1 at time t (so, if no other task migrates, then the cost to the migrating task is unchanged.) We consider a modification in which neutral moves are specifically disallowed (see Figure 2) . That seemingly-minor change is necessary to ensure fast convergence from an almost balanced state to a perfectlybalanced state. To summarize, here are the most important features of the modified protocol:
• We do not need any global information whatsoever (apart from the number of available resources); in particular, a task does not need to know the total number of tasks in the system. Also, it is strongly distributed and concurrent. If additional tasks were to enter the system, it would rapidly converge once again, with no outside intervention.
• A migrating task needs to query the load of only one other resource (thus, doing a constant amount of work in each round).
• When a task finds a resource with a significantly smaller load (that is, a load that is smaller by at least two), the migration policy is exactly the same as that used by the Nash rerouting policy of Figure 1 , so the incentive is to use that probability.
• When a task finds a resource with a load that is smaller by exactly one unit, the migration policy is sufficiently close to the Nash rerouting policy that the difference in expected load is at most one, and there is little incentive to deviate.
• The protocol is simple (as well as provably efficient) enough to convince users to actually stick to it.
Related Work
The papers [5, 8, 6] are most closely related to this work. Even-Dar et al. [5] introduce the idea of using a potential function to measure closeness to a balanced allocation, and use it to show convergence for sequences of randomly-selected "best response" moves in a more general setting in which tasks may have variable weights and resources may have variable capacities. (A "best response" move is one where a task migrates to a resource with smallest cost. In order to ensure that a move is best response, it is necessary to do them consecutively rather than concurrently.) Goldberg [8] considered a protocol in which tasks select alternative resources at random and migrate if the alternative load is lower. The protocol may be implemented in a weakly distributed sense, requiring that migration events take place one at a time, and costs are updated immediately.
Most recently, Even-Dar and Mansour allow concurrent, independent rerouting decisions where tasks are allowed to migrate from overloaded to underloaded resources. Their rerouting process terminates in expected O(log log m + log n) rounds when the system reaches a Nash equilibrium. This faster convergence (in terms of the number n of resources) is attained using a certain amount of global knowledge. A task is required to know whether its link is overloaded (having above average load) and tasks on underloaded links do not migrate at all. Our rerouting policy does not require that agents know anything other that their current link load, and the load of a randomly-chosen alternative. EvenDar and Mansour also present a general framework that can be used to show a logarithmic convergence rate for a wide class of rerouting strategies. Our protocol does not fall into that class, since we do not require migrations to occur only from overloaded links. Furthermore, our reassignment strategy has a non-logarithmic lower bound on the convergence time.
Our rerouting strategy is also related to reallocation processes for balls into bins games. The goal of a balls into bins game is to allocate m balls as evenly as possible into n bins. It is well-known that a fairly even distribution can be achieved if every ball is allowed to randomly choose d bins and then the ball is allocated to the least loaded among the chosen bin (see [13] for an overview). Czumaj, Riley, and Scheideler [3] consider such an allocation where each ball initially chooses two bins. They show that, in a polynomial number of steps, the reallocation process ends up in a state with maximum load at most m/n + 1. In [16] Sanders, Egner, and Korst show that a maximum load of m/n + 1 is optimal if every ball is restricted to two random choices.
Leaving aside the distributed framework, our scenario becomes a special case of one introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [10] . They consider n parallel links (resources) and a set T of m tasks. (In [10] and subsequent papers, usually m denotes the number of resources and n the number of tasks. Here we are using m and n as they are used the balls-into-bins literature.) Each link i comes with delay d i , and each task with a weight w i . (In this paper, all weights and delays are the same.) An assignment is a vector A = (A 1 , . . . , A m ) which assigns the i-th task to resource A i . In the language of game theory, an assignment associates each task with a pure strategy. The load of resource in assignment A is defined to be L( , A) = d i∈T :Ai= w i . The load of task i in assignment A is L (A i , A) . A is said to be a Nash assignment if, for every task i and every resource ,
, where the assignment A is derived from A by re-assigning task i to resource , and making no other change. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou worked in the more general setting of mixed strategies. In a mixed strategy, instead of choosing a resource A i , task i chooses a vector (p i,1 , . . . , p i,m ) in which p i,j denotes the probability with which task i will use resource j. A collection of mixed strategies (one strategy for each task) is a Nash equilibrium if no task can reduce its expected cost by modifying its own probability vector. Much research has been done since then (for example [12, 4, 7, 15, 2] ) in different contexts and with different goals. In Section 4, we provide two lower bound results. The first one, Theorem 4.1, shows that the first protocol (of Figure 1 , including moves that do not necessarily yield a strict improvement for an individual task but allow for simply "neutral" moves as well, results in exponential (in n) expected convergence time. Finally, in Theorem 4.2 we provide a general lower bound (regardless of which of the two protocols is being used) on the expected convergence time of Ω(log log m). This lower bound matches the upper bound as a function of m.
Overview of our results

Notation
There are m tasks and n resources. An assignment of tasks to resources is represented as a vector (x 1 , . . . , x n ) in which x i denotes the number of tasks that are assigned to resource i. In the remainder of this paper, [n] denotes {1, . . . , n}. The assignment is a Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [n], |x i − x j | ≤ 1. We study a distributed process for constructing a Nash equilibrium. The states of the process, X(0), X(1), . . ., are assignments. The transition from state X(t) = (X 1 (t), . . . , X n (t)) to state X(t + 1) is given by the greedy distributed protocol in Figure 2 .
For each task b do in parallel
Let i b be the current resource of task b Choose resource j b uniformly at random
The modified protocol, with "neutral moves" disallowed.
Note that if X(t) is a Nash equilibrium, then X(t + 1) = X(t) so the assignment stops changing. Here is a formal description of the transition from a state
be a random variable drawn from a multinomial distribution with the constraint
represents the number of migrations from i to j in a round.) The corresponding probabilities (p i,1 (x), . . . , p i,n (x)) are given by
Upper bound on convergence time
Our main result is the following THEOREM 3.1. Let T be the number of rounds taken by the protocol of Figure 2 to reach a Nash equilibrium for the first
The proof of this theorem proceeds as follows. First (Lemma 3.1) we give an upper bound on E[Φ(X(t))] which implies (Corollary 3.3) that there is a τ = O(log log m) such that, with high probability, Φ(X(τ )) = O(n). We also show (Observation 3.4 and Corollary 3.5) that Φ(X(t)) is a super-martingale and (Lemma 3.5) that it has enough variance. Using these facts, we obtain the upper bound on the convergence time.
Proof.
which can be simplified into the required form. 2
Proof. Using Observation 3.1,
and the second term is zero since
Proof. 
Using Observations 3.2 and 3.3, this is at most nx
so the result follows. 2
Proof. In the proof of Observation 3.4, we established that
and
Proof. The proof is by induction on t. The base case is t = 0. For the inductive step, note that 1−2 −t = t k=1 2 −k . Suppose that for all t < t, E[Φ(X(t ))] > 18n (otherwise we are finished). Then by Corollary 3.1,
Applying the inductive hypothesis,
Proof. Take t = lg lg Φ(X(0)) . Either there is a τ < t with E[Φ(X(τ ))] ≤ 18n or, by the lemma, Suppose assignment x is not -Nash. If X(t) = x there exist resources i, j with X i (t) − X j (t) > m/n. If X(t + 1) is obtained from X(t) by transferring m/2n tasks from i to j, then it can be shown that Φ(X(t)) − Φ(X(t + 1)) ≥ ( m/2n) 2 . It follows that Φ(X(t)) ≥ ( m/2n) 2 . From Corollary 3.3, Pr(Φ(X(τ )) < 720n) > 39 40 , for τ = log log(Φ(0)) = O(log log m).
An assignment X(τ ) with Φ(X(τ )) ≤ 720n must be -Nash if ( m/2n) 2 
Corollary 3.3 tells us that Φ(X(τ )) is likely to be O(n).
We want to show that Φ(X(t)) quickly gets even smaller (all the way to a Nash equilibrium) and to this end, we show that Φ(X(t)) is a super-martingale. By Observation 3.4, it suffices to show u(x) ≤ Φ(x), and we proceed with this.
In
Proof. For all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [n] we have |x
, where
Plugging in these expressions and simplifying, we get
0 n 3 + 4n 0 n 1 n 3 + 4n 0 n 2 n 3 + +4n 1 n 2 n 3 + 3n 0 n 2 3 + 8n 2 0 n 4 + 12n 0 n 1 n 4 + +3n 2 1 n 4 + 8n 0 n 2 n 4 + 4n 1 n 2 n 4 + 12n 0 n 3 n 4 + +4n 1 n 3 n 4 + 4n 2 n 3 n 4 + 8n 0 n 
e., the potential drop for x is at least as big as that for w.
Proof. Let k = |x n − x|. We will show
which is non-negative since k ≥ 2.5 ≥ 1 + √ 2.
First, we prove (1). Let f (z) =
Furthermore the second derivative is f (z) = 2(n − 1) ≥ 0. Thus, f (z) is minimized at z = w. Now note that
Now we finish the proof by proving (2) . Assume first that
The representation of w in terms of z j s is the same as the representation of x except that z xn is reduced by one. Therefore,
But since z xn ≤ n − z xn−1 , the upper bound on the righthand side is at most
which is at most n 2 since the right-hand side is maximized at z xn−1 = n. To finish the proof of (2), use the definition of u to deduce that
The proof of (2) when x n = x − k is similar. 2
Proof. The proof is by induction on n. The base case, n = 1, follows from Lemma 3.3. Suppose n > 1. Neither Φ(x) nor u(x) depends upon the order of the components in x, so assume without loss of generality that |x i − x| ≤ |x n − x| for all i. If |x n − x| < 2.5 then apply Lemma 3.3. Otherwise, use Lemma 3.4 to find an assignment w = (w 1 , . . . ,
Together, Observation 3.4 and Corollary 3.5 tell us that
The next lemma will be used to give a lower bound on the variance of the process. Let V = 0.4n −2 . Note that, given the conditioning, each of these choices occurs with probability at least n −2 . Also, Φ(x 1 ), Φ(x 2 ) and Φ(x 3 ) are not all the same. Thus, Pr(Φ(
LEMMA 3.5. Suppose that X(t) = x and that x is not a Nash equilibrium. Then
Pr(Φ(X(t + 1) = Φ(x) | X(t) = x) ≥ V.
Proof. Choose s and such that for all
Since the derivative with respect to x s is negative, this is minimized by taking x s as large as possible, namely x − 2, so Pr(x + > 2) ≥ 1 − 7e −2 ≥ 0.4, and the result follows. 2
In order to finish our proof of convergence, we need the following observation about Φ(x). Proof. Suppose that in assignment x there are resources i and j such that x i − x j ≥ 2. Let x be the assignment constructed from x by transferring a task from resource i to resource j. Then
Now suppose that, in some assignment x , resources i and j satisfy x i ≥ x j > 0. Let x be the assignment constructed from x by transferring a task from resource j to resource i. Since (x i + 1) − (x j − 1) ≥ 2, the above argument gives Φ(x) > Φ(x ). We conclude that an assignment x with maximum Φ(x) must have all of the tasks in the same resource, with Φ(x) = m 2 . Furthermore, an assignment x with minimum Φ(x) must have |x i − x j | ≤ 1 for all i, j. In this case there must be r resources with loads of q + 1 and n − r resources with loads of q, where m = qn + r. So
Note that x is a Nash assignment if and only if |x i − x j | ≤ 1 for all i and j. 2
Combining Observation 3.5 and Corollary 3.3 we find that there is a τ ≤ lg lg m
LEMMA 3.6. Given any starting state X(0) = x, the probability that X(t ) is a Nash equilibrium is at least 3/4.
Proof. The proof is based on a standard martingale argument, see [11] . Suppose that
B).
Note that D 0 ≤ 720n. Together, Observation 3.4 and Corollary 3.5 tell us that W t is a supermartingale. This implies that D t is also a supermartingale since
Together, Lemma 3.5 and Observation 3.5 tell us that if
Note that T is a stopping time. Define Z t = (B − D t ) 2 − V t, and observe that Z t∧T is a sub-martingale, where t ∧ T denotes the minimum of t and T . Let p be the probability that (a) occurs. By the optional stopping theorem
. Also, by the optional stopping theorem
. So, if we now run for 10B 2 /V steps, then the probability that we do not reach a Nash equilibrium is at most 
. , 0). Let T be the first time at which X(t) is a Nash equilibrium. Then E[T ] = exp(Θ( √ n)).
Proof. For an assignment x, let n 0 (x) denote the number of resources i with x i = 0. Thus, n 0 (X(0)) = n − 1. The (unique) Nash equilibrium x assigns one task to each resource, so n 0 (x) = 0. Let k = √ n . We will show that for any assignment x with n 0 (x) ≥ k,
This implies the result. Suppose X(t − 1) = x with n 0 (x) ≥ k. For convenience, let n 0 denote n 0 (x). Let x denote X(t), and let n 0 denote n 0 (x ). We will use the phrase "with very high probability" to mean with probability at least 1 − exp(−Θ( √ n)). We will show that, with very high probability, n 0 ≥ k.
During the course of the proof, we will assume, where necessary, that n is sufficiently large. This is without loss of generality given the Θ notation in the statement of the result. Case 1. n 0 > 8k. Consider the protocol in Figure 1 . Let U = {b | x j b = 0}. E[|U |] = n 0 , so by a Chernoff bound, |U | ≥ n 0 /2 + 3n 0 /8 with very high probability. Suppose this is the case. Partition U into U 1 and U 2 with
so by a Chernoff bound, with very high probability, |U | ≥ k, which implies n 0 ≥ k.
Consider the protocol in Figure 1 . Let L be the set of "loners" defined by L = {i | x i = 1} and let = |L|. The number of resources i with x i > 1 is n − n 0 − and this is at most half as many as the number of tasks assigned to such resources (which is n − ), so Otherwise, let
so, with very high probability, |U | ≥
Suppose then that |S| ≥ n0 40 n 2 . Assuming that n is
, so with very high probability, T < |R|/100. In that case,
The following theorem provides a lower bound on the expected convergence time regardless of which of the two protocols is being used. Proof. Note that both protocols have the same behaviour since m is even and, therefore, the situation x 1 = x 2 + 1 cannot arise. For concreteness, focus on the protocol in Figure 2 .
Let y(x) = max i x i − m/2 and let y t = y(X(t)) so y 0 = m/2 and, for a Nash equilibrium x, y(x) = 0. We will show that for any assignment x, Pr(y t+1 > y(x) 1/10 |
. Suppose X(t) = x is an assignment with x 1 ≥ x 2 . As we have seen in Section 2, Y 1,2 (x) (the number of migrations from resource 1 to resource 2 in the round) is a binomial random variable
In general, let T t be the number of migrations from the mostloaded resource in X(t) to the least-loaded resource and note
Note that the mode of a binomial distribution is one or both of the integers closest to the expectation, and the distribution is monotonically decreasing as you move away from the mode. 
Similarly, for j < 0, We say that the transition from y t to y t+1 is a "fast round" if y t+1 ≤ y Also, if j < r then these probabilities increase geometrically so that the ratio of the probability that the transition to y j+1 is the first fast round and the probability that the transition to y j is the first fast round is . Therefore, with probability at least 1/2, all of the first r rounds are slow. In this case, arg min t (y t ≤ 16) = Ω(log log(m)), which proves the theorem.
2
We also have the following observation. 
, 1). Let T be the first time at which X(t) is a Nash equilibrium. Then E[T ] = Ω(n).
The observation follows from the fact that the state does not change until one of the two tasks assigned to the first resource chooses the second resource.
Conclusions
We have analyzed a very simple, strongly distributed rerouting protocol for m tasks on n resources. We have proved an upper bound of (log log m + n 4 ) on the expected convergence time (convergence to a Nash equilibrium), and for m > n 3 an upper bound of O(log log m) on approximate convergence time. Our lower bound of Ω(log log m + n) matches the upper bound as function of m. We have also shown an exponential lower bound on the convergence time for a related protocol that allows "neutral moves".
